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Abstract
This paper proposes a (k, n)-threshold secret image
sharing scheme that offers flexibility in terms of meeting
contrasting demands such as information security and stor-
age efficiency with the help of a randomized kernel (binary
matrix) operation. A secret image is split into n shares such
that any k or more shares (k ≤ n) can be used to recon-
struct the image. Each share has a size less than or at most
equal to the size of the secret image. Security and share
sizes are solely determined by the kernel of the scheme. The
kernel operation is optimized in terms of the security and
computational requirements. The storage overhead of the
kernel can further be made independent of its size by effi-
ciently storing it as a sparse matrix. Moreover, the scheme
is free from any kind of single point of failure (SPOF).
1. Introduction
In storage systems, information security is a top priority
alongside efficient storage. Most of the methods that have
been proposed with enhanced security have single storage
mechanism, which makes the entire system vulnerable if
the stored data is corrupted. This makes the storage sys-
tem a single point of failure (SPOF) for the entire scheme.
To avoid this vulnerability, (k, n)-threshold secret sharing
techniques are used to divide the information across n par-
ticipants such that the shares of k or more participants can
reconstruct the secret. Secret sharing has been an active area
of research in the field of efficient and secure storage of data
since late 20th century and has seen a lot of advancements
in the recent decades.
Some of the first threshold secret sharing schemes pro-
posed were Blakley [1] which involves a geometric ap-
proach and Shamir [2] which uses polynomial interpola-
tion. Later Mignotte [3] and Asmuth-Bloom [4] came up
with similar threshold schemes based on Chinese remain-
der theorem. Ito et al. [5] proposed a more general secret
sharing scheme with access structures to denote the subsets
of all participants who can form a qualified group for secret
reconstruction.
A (k,n)-threshold secret sharing scheme which leaks no
information of the secret to an unqualified group of k − 1
or fewer participants is called Perfect Secret Sharing (PSS),
suggested by Karnin et al. [6]. When exposed, informa-
tion of the secret is tantamount to the amount of unqualified
coalition of secret shares, the type of scheme is called Ramp
Secret Sharing (RSS) [7]. The classification between PSS
and RSS is suggested in [8]. While the methods proposed
in [1] and [2] are PSS schemes, [4] does not ensure per-
fect secrecy of the shares. Bai [9] proposed an RSS scheme
that performs matrix projection using randomly generated
matrices.
Thien and Lin [10] proposed how Shamir’s (k, n)-
threshold scheme can be extended to images by reducing
the size of secret shares by a factor of k relative to the orig-
inal image size. Though this method is very efficient in
reducing the size of shares, it is not lossless due to trunca-
tion distortion. Moreover, the method is not a PSS scheme
because there is a possibility of interpreting the secret in-
formation from compromise of k − 1 or fewer shares. This
drawback arises because of high spatial correlation of pix-
els in natural images. Though permuting image pixels as
pre-processing can reduce this correlation, it cannot be con-
sidered as a fool-proof solution to the problem. Kuang-Shyr
Wu [11] proposed an elegant method to overcome the trun-
cation distortion in Thien-Lin’s approach without using ex-
tra memory. This method exploits the high spatial correla-
tion of pixels in natural images to its advantage.
Group signature, group encryption and secure multi-
party computation employ a variant of secret sharing that
also performs user authentication, known as Verifiable Se-
cret Sharing (VSS), proposed by Chor et al. [12]. To pre-
vent the malicious modification of shares, there are meth-
ods proposed for cheating prevention [13] and verifiability
[14, 15]. Visual Cryptography Schemes (VCS), introduced
by Naor and Shamir [16] is another active research area that
uses secret sharing. Multiple-Secret VCS [17], XOR based
VCS [18], General access structure in VCS [19], Region
Incrementing VCS and Fully Incrementing VCS [20] are
some variants of VCS.
Despite the shortcomings, most of the present-day se-
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cret image sharing schemes use Thien-Lin’s [10] method
because of the high efficiency offered in terms of share size.
While simplicity and storage efficiency are very desirable
features, patching up major vulnerabilities of this method
has motivated our research. The proposed method offers
some improvisations to obviate the drawbacks that arise due
to spatial correlation with a controlled increase in the share
sizes.
Rest of the paper is organized as follows: (k, n)-
threshold secret sharing mechanisms are discussed in Sec-
tion 2. The proposed method is illustrated in Section 3. An
adversarial model for the scheme is described in Section 4.
The computational complexity and security analysis for the
proposed method is done in Section 5 and Section 6. Finally
the conclusions are summarized in Section 7.
2. Preliminaries – Secret Sharing Schemes
Secret sharing is a way to distribute secret information
across multiple participants such that only a qualified sub-
set of participants can reconstruct the secret by pooling their
shares. Although many approaches have been proposed
to achieve (k, n)-threshold secret sharing schemes, polyno-
mial schemes remain the most widely used. These schemes
sample points from a polynomial for share generation and
use Lagrange’s interpolation for reconstruction.
2.1. Shamir’s (k, n) Secret Sharing Scheme [2]
Shamir’s (k, n)-threshold secret sharing technique uses a
(k − 1)th degree polynomial function defined as
f(x) = (d0 + d1x+ d2x
2 + · · ·+ dk−1xk−1) mod p (1)
where d0 is the secret information, p is a prime number, and
d1, d2, ..., dk−1 are random numbers. Let yi = f(xi), 1 ≤
i ≤ n, and 0 < x1 < x2 · · · < xn < p , then the pairs
(xi, yi) form the secret shares. Shamir’s scheme is based
on the fact that atleast k distinct points on a (k − 1)th de-
gree polynomial are required to reconstruct the polynomial,
making it a PSS. Alternatively, with k shares, it is possible
to construct k linear equations in k variables which have a
consistent solution. Lagrange’s interpolation is used to find
the coefficients of f(x) and subsequently the secret infor-
mation. This scheme can be directly extended to images
by taking each pixel at a time as secret information. As
each pixel has a separate polynomial equation, each of the
n generated shares have the size of original image, making
the scheme storage inefficient. It has to be noted that dif-
ferent random numbers are generated for each pixel’s share
equation.
2.2. Thien-Lin’s Secret Image Sharing Scheme [10]
Thien-Lin’s method proposes a memory efficient way to
extend Shamir’s [2] method to images. Instead of taking one
pixel at a time, the method suggests substituting all the k
coefficients with pixel values in (1). Taking k elements at a
time to generate n shares, makes the total size of shares n/k
times of the original image, with each share 1/k times the
size of original image. Image pixels are chosen sequentially
or according to a permutation cipher, as the coefficients of
the polynomial in (1). Once the share images are gener-
ated, the polynomial is destroyed and the share images are
distributed among the participants. During reconstruction,
with k or more participants, the generated pixel intensities
must be sequentially mapped to the secret image in the or-
der in which they were selected.
Although the method is storage efficient, it has some
drawbacks. The reconstruction is not lossless as all the pixel
values above 250 are truncated to 250 (The value of p in (1)
is taken as 251, the largest prime number less than 256).
This is called truncation distortion. Also, Thien-Lin’s ap-
proach is not a PSS as less than k shares can provide partial
information about the secret image. This arises because of
high spatial correlation in natural images. Though one can-
not exactly determine all the k pixel values, it is possible to
estimate pixel intensities as all the coefficients of the poly-
nomial are approximately in the same range. Hence, the
polynomial in (1) can be modified as
f(x) ≈ (d0(1 + x+ x2 + · · ·+ xk−1)) mod p . (2)
Given one share pair (xi, yi), we can guess d0 which is
nearly same as d1, d2, , dk−1 due to high spatial correlation.
Note that more shares would lead to more accurate predic-
tions and hence fail the secrecy of the scheme.
2.3. Kuang-Shyr Wu Secret Image Sharing Scheme
[11]
Kuang-Shyr Wu suggested a modification to Thien-Lin’s
[10] method to avoid the truncation distortion. Wu’s method
suggests the value of p to be chosen as 257 (p is taken as
251 in Thien-Lin’s method). The share values generated lie
in the interval of 0 and 256 (requires 9 bit encoding), but
the image intensities lie in the interval of 0 and 255 (8 bit
encoding). The need for additional memory is avoided by
treating 256 as a special case and storing it as a 0. These
shares are then distributed across participants and the poly-
nomial is destroyed. During reconstruction, whenever a 0 is
encountered, different combinations of 0 and 256 are used
to generate candidate solutions. The best candidate solution
is the one with the least total squared-euclidean distance of
every pixel to its neighbours.
3. Proposed Method
Thien-Lin’s [10] method with Wu’s [11] modification
would not be considered as a PSS as the correlation between
pixels could leak some information of the secret image. Al-
though using a pseudorandom permutation cipher as sug-
gested in [10] reduces the spatial correlation between co-
efficients of the polynomial, the cipher becomes an SPOF
for the entire scheme [8]. Furthermore, implementation
of a pseudorandom permutation cipher as preprocessing in
Thien-Lin’s method is specific to a particular image dimen-
sions and requires memory of the order of image size. Ad-
ditionally, this process always generates the same permuta-
tion of pixels and subsequently the same shares for a given
image. The system can be made less vulnerable by making
some of the coefficients of the polynomial random, instead
of image pixel values. Such a method however will be ef-
fective only if the number of random coefficients and their
positions in the polynomial remain variable and unknown
to the attacker. However, the randomness introduced must
be perfectly predictable using a key for reliable reconstruc-
tion. In the proposed method, a kernel (binary matrix) is
chosen as the key, through which one can accordingly vary
the amount of randomness to be introduced which scales the
security and share size. Details of the proposed method are
described in the following subsections.
Figure 1: (a) Example of a 5× 5 kernel, k=5, with C = 1.2
and gray cells corresponding to ones in the kernel; (b) 9× 9
image matrix with cells values corresponding to intensities,
the kernel is placed in its initial position; (c) k values picked
from the corresponding kernel position in (b).
3.1. Kernel Properties
The kernel must follow certain properties for efficient
share generation. It must have a total of k ones and rest
all cells are zeros, where k is the threshold of the scheme.
The first element in the kernel is one and the rest k−1 ones
are randomly distributed in the kernel as shown in Fig. 1(a).
A kernel with large dimensions for a given k value provides
greater security with the same memory and computational
requirements (by storing the kernel as a binary sparse ma-
trix).
3.2. Kernel Operation
The kernel operation shifts the chosen kernel over the
image ensuring that each pixel is selected only once. At
each position of the kernel, k elements are selected cor-
responding to the k ones in the kernel, i.e. pixel intensi-
ties that correspond to the ones in the kernel are picked,
as shown in Fig. 1(b) and Fig. 1(c). Picking the same
pixel twice is avoided by replacing it with a random num-
ber. Similarly, when the kernel goes partially outside the
image bounds, random numbers are assigned for the ones
that do not correspond to any image pixel. Disclosure of
pixel data to attacks that leverage the high correlation in im-
ages is averted as the random numbers plummet the correla-
tion between coefficients in the polynomial. This advantage
in terms of security comes with a marginal increase in share
sizes as the shares now hold the data of the randomly gen-
erated numbers in addition to pixel data. With controlled
increase in share size, the kernel operation will prevent loss
of pixel information through attacks that rely on the high
spatial correlation of image pixels.
Figure 2: A 9 × 9 block same as the dimensions of the im-
age in Fig. 1(b), showing the sequence of positions taken
by the kernel in the order of numbering. X denotes previ-
ously used pixels which cannot be part of the sequence of
positions taken by the kernel. The dotted arrows are used
to show the order in which one must search for the nearest
unmarked pixel (least Manhattan distance). The first and
the 26th positions of the kernel have been shown. Note that
the 26th kernel position has two out-of-image-bounds pixel
selections.
To prevent further storage overhead and for reliable re-
construction, the sequence of positions taken by the kernel
must be derived from the kernel itself. One efficient ap-
proach to generate the sequence of positions (ensures mini-
mum share sizes for a given kernel) is to initially place the
Figure 3: Example 5×5 kernels with k = 5. Gray pixels represent the ones in the kernel with numbering numbering denoting
the order in which pixels are selected. (a) C = 0.2; (b) C = 0.8; (c) C = 1.0; (d) C = 3.2.
kernel such that the first pixel of the image and that of the
kernel coincide. At each position, all the image pixels that
coincide with the ones in the kernel are marked. Now the
kernel is shifted to a new position such that the first pixel of
the kernel coincides with the nearest pixel to the first pixel
(least Manhattan distance) of the image that is not marked
previously. Subsequently the kernel is moved to positions
farther from the first pixel sequentially until all the pixels in
the image are covered. The sequence of positions taken by
the kernel in Fig. 1(a) over the image Fig. 1(b) is shown in
Fig.2.
3.3. Coefficient of Incidence
We define coefficient of incidence (C) for a kernel as the
ratio of number of random numbers generated to pixel data,
when the kernel operation is performed on an image having
the same dimensions as the kernel. We describe an itera-
tive approach Algorithm 1 to estimate the C. The value
of C for a kernel can vary from 0 (no random coefficients,
scheme reduces to Thien-Lin’s [10] method) to k − 1 (the-
oretical limit, scheme reduces to Shamir’s [2] method for
sharing images). Example 5 × 5 kernels and their corre-
sponding C values are shown in Fig. 3. It has to be noted
that although the C of Shamir’s scheme is k − 1 (as for ev-
ery pixel, we select k − 1 random numbers to generate the
share polynomial), there does not exist a kernel that satis-
fies the constraints. As shown in Fig. 4, the number of ran-
dom coefficients in the polynomial relative to the number of
image pixels selected is highly correlated to C (correlation
coefficient = 0.9407 in Fig. 4(a)) and broadly independent
of image size (with increase in image size, the variability
in the ratio of random to pixel data decreases). This em-
pirically shows that C is a good metric to compare kernels
based on the amount of randomness they produce when op-
erated over an image of unknown dimensions. Greater the
value of C, greater the number of random coefficients in the
polynomials for a given image size, leading to greater share
sizes.
Algorithm 1: Coefficient of Incidence
input : X is the set of positions of all ones in the
kernel.
Y is the set of positions of all zeros in the
kernel.
output: C is the coefficient of incidence of the kernel.
1 S ←− X;
2 r ←− 0;
3 for y ∈ Y ∩ Sc do
4 X ′ ←− X + y;
// X′ is the set of positions of all ones
in the kernel when the starting pixel
is shifted to y
5 r ←− r + |X ′ ∩ S|+ |X ′ ∩ Sc ∩ (X ∪ Y )c|;
6 S ←− X ′ ∪ S;
7 end
8 C ←− r|X∪Y | ;
3.4. Secret Share Generation
In the proposed method, the kernel is just a selection
mechanism that is being used to choose a permutation of
image pixels along with a few random numbers. This is
ensured by sequentially moving the kernel in the sequence
of positions generated from the kernel itself. At each step,
the kernel operation returns k values (sequence of pixel data
and random numbers) which are used as coefficients to gen-
erate the share polynomial in (1). To avoid kernel from
becoming SPOF for the entire scheme, it is shared along
with the image across the n participants. As the kernel data
is uncorrelated it can be directly shared using Thien-Lin’s
[10] scheme. Kernel is also treated as a secret image and is
divided into n kernel shares using Thien-Lin’s share gener-
ation procedure,
fkernel(x) = (γ0 + γ1x+ γ2x
2 + · · ·+ γk−1xk−1) mod 2
(3)
where the polynomial coefficients are the binary kernel
data. Shares are generated from the polynomials and then
(a) Plot between C and the ratio of random to pixel data for multiple
45 × 45 kernel with varying k values over images of various sizes
(correlation coefficient = 0.9407).
(b) Plot between the ratio of random to pixel data and image size for
the kernel in Fig. 3(d). Here image size refers the number of pixels
present in the image.
Figure 4: Scatter plots denoting the relationship betweenC,
the ratio of random to pixel data and image size.
the polynomials are destroyed. These shares are then dis-
tributed across the participants.
3.5. Secret Image Reconstruction
First step of reconstruction is to pool the kernel shares to
regenerate the kernel using Thien-Lin’s [10] secret recon-
struction procedure. As the sequence of positions a kernel
assumes while traversing the image is deterministic from
the kernel itself, we can retrace the positions that the ker-
nel takes. At every position of the kernel, k or more image
shares are collected to find the corresponding coefficients
of the polynomial using Lagrange’s interpolation. Then at
every position of the kernel, the coefficients of the polyno-
mial are mapped to the corresponding pixels, in the order in
which they were selected by the kernel in the construction
phase. Pixels that are already mapped must not be overwrit-
ten, as the later generated values correspond to the random
coefficients. Same is the case for all the kernel indices that
go out of image bounds, all these values correspond to ran-
dom numbers which are to be discarded.
4. Adversarial model
The (k, n) value, identities of the n participants and the
agent that is responsible for the share generation and distri-
bution are assumed to be available to everyone in the model.
It is assumed that the agent and the n participants always
follow the protocol. Also the communication between the
agent and the participants during share distribution is as-
sumed to be secure. Any communication that involves the
agent requires authentication, thereby making it impossi-
ble for an adversary to mimic or replay an agent-participant
interaction. This makes the agent a trusted entity among
the participants. Most of these assumptions are valid in the
case of data centers where the communications between the
servers inside the facility are assumed to be secure. As the
share distribution process is assumed to be secure, the ad-
versary cannot possess a valid share. However, the adver-
sary is capable of deceiving other participants to be one of
the n participants. So in this case, the adversary along with
k − 1 participants shall first pool their kernel shares to gen-
erate the kernel. As the shares used by the adversary are not
authentic, the kernel generated from polynomial interpola-
tion is highly improbable to satisfy the (k, n) property (i.e
sparse matrix with k ones). This alerts the k members that
one among them is an adversary, but does not reveal who.
Although the transaction does not proceed any further, the
adversary can prevent other transactions by intervening in
them. This problem can be avoided by implementing a veri-
fication scheme [14, 15], where each participant must verify
their credentials before the start of any transaction.
Assuming that the adversary is aware of the kernel size
and image size, the probability of a random guess by the
adversary to actually lead to a successful kernel share is,
Pr(Generating the correct kernel|k, S) = 1
2
S
k
(4)
where S is the size of the kernel (as the kernel shares are
S/k bits long, and only one combination leads to perfect
reconstruction). It can be seen from the (4) that increasing
the kernel dimensions for a given k provides greater security
against random guessing attacks. The computational com-
plexity of the kernel operation can be made independent of
kernel dimensions by storing it as a sparse matrix. How-
ever, greater S requires greater kernel share sizes. Hence
it is crucial to choose an appropriate value for S that bal-
ances the trade-off between scheme secrecy and storage ef-
ficiency. Further, in the secret image reconstruction phase,
every share polynomial equation can have p values (p is
taken as 251 in Thien-Lin’s [10] method) and there are a
total of M/k equations where M is the share size (M also
remains unknown to the adversary as the amount of ran-
domness is controlled solely by the kernel). Assuming M
is known to the adversary,
Pr(Generating the correct secret image|k, S) = 1
pM/k
.
(5)
5. Analysis of the scheme
The proposed method uses a fixed-sized kernel for se-
cret sharing images of different dimensions. Even kernels
with large dimensions can be stored as a sparse matrix, mak-
ing them more memory efficient than permutation ciphers.
Use of the kernel to mix a variable number of random num-
bers with pixel data makes the scheme more secure against
attacks that rely on high spatial correlation in images. It
is also implausible to reconstruct the original secret image
back from its shares, using an incorrect kernel while follow-
ing the procedure in the proposed method. This is because
there is no other way to differentiate the random numbers
from pixel data or obtain the sequence of positions with-
out the kernel. The kernel alone defines the sizes of shares
and the amount of randomness present in the coefficients of
the share polynomial. To avoid the kernel form becoming
a SPOF for the entire scheme, it is also shared across the
participants using Thien-Lin’s [10] method.
Although using a permutation cipher also reduces the
correlation as suggested in [10] it becomes a SPOF for
the scheme. The proposed method suggests that the ker-
nel operation is not just memory efficient but also avoids
any form of SPOF by sharing the kernel across the partic-
ipants. Further, Thien-Lin’s method always generates the
same shares for a given secret image. This makes Thien-
Lin’s method vulnerable as even if one participant was com-
promised, the adversary shall have access to the entire his-
tory of the participant’s shares of the shared secret images
and consequently predict with very high probability which
secret images were shared more than once. Alternatively,
the proposed method generates different shares each time
for the same secret image. This variability in shares is at-
tributed to the random numbers introduced by the kernel.
Share generation in a (k, n)-threshold secret sharing
scheme has a computational complexity of order O(nk).
For reconstruction of polynomial coefficients from k shares
using Lagrange’s interpolation, each coefficient demands a
complexity of order O(k). Hence, overall computational
complexity of finding all the coefficients is of the order
O(k2). Only when k or more participants combine their
kernel’s shares they can reconstruct the kernel which in turn
will be used for image reconstruction. With k − 1 or fewer
shares, it is not possible to reconstruct the kernel and subse-
quently the secret image (any interpolation technique would
fail when the data is uncorrelated). It is advisable to use a
sparse matrix as the kernel, as it will significantly reduce
the random guessing attacks on the kernel.
The coefficient of incidence (C) correlates well with the
ratio of random to pixel data, making it a quantifiable mea-
sure to compare and differentiate between different kernels.
Security and storage space are two contrasting factors that
generally exhibit a trade-off. For better security from at-
tacks that exploit the correlation of the pixels in the image,
a kernel with high C must be chosen. This however will
result in larger share sizes which may not be desirable. On
the other hand, a kernel with low C will result in efficient
share sizes but make the scheme more vulnerable to attacks.
One possible solution for a kernel with low C is to choose
the positions of ones in the kernel in a cyclic group over ad-
dition. When we are shifting the kernel to a new position,
essentially we are shifting it to a position which is not a part
of the group (as a new position must be an unmarked pixel).
As translation of a kernel is an additive operation on posi-
tion, the new set of ones also forms a cyclic group but has
no element in common with the previous group. This drasti-
cally reduces the number of random coefficients in the share
polynomial (1). Further, increase in kernel size (S) makes
the scheme more secure (4) while also increases the share
sizes.
6. Conclusion
The proposed (k, n) threshold scheme uses Shamir’s
(k, n)-threshold secret sharing technique and its modifica-
tion by Thien-Lin for sharing images. Kuang-Shyr Wu’s
method is optional as it further avoids truncation distortion
along with providing a stronger immunity against random
guessing attacks. Size of shares and the level of security
are the key aspects of secret sharing. This paper discusses
a general method that has versatile applications due to the
flexibility offered by the kernel over these two key aspects.
Moreover, the kernel’s storage requirements are negligible
when compared to image size, yet the kernel operation
can be performed over images of any dimension. Further,
the scheme is free from any form of SPOF. Coefficient
of incidence is defined to help the users select a kernel
that offers the desired share size and share security. The
proposed method ensures that the compromise of any k− 1
or fewer shares will not leak any information about the
secret image. For further details about the procedure and
comparison among various other secret image sharing
schemes, we refer readers to the supplementary material at
https://akella17.github.io/kernel papers/Supplementary.pdf.
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